

MOORE (1944) ON ANALYSIS

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


Prof. Moore does not examine systematically the relation between analysandum and analysans and does not define the conditions under which the analysis is correct. His analyses consist in translation and hence are formal. But if analysandum and analysans have the same meaning the analysis is apparently trivial.

But what I have analyzed has never been a verbal expression...

What does it mean for a sentence to mean?

How can a definition of meaning be given?

Is a proposition that gives such a definition and seems to me to be true true? What are the reasons to believe that?



Questions to be answered

1. Moore's early analyses are regarded as a classic example of decompositional analysis. Russell's analysis of definite descriptions is transformational. At the same time it fulfills requirements formulated by Moore for any correct non-trivial analysis. If we assume that Moore's analyses also meet these requirements can we still call them decompositional? How can we characterize analysis described by Moore in his 1944 paper?
2. Is analysis defined by Moore subject to the paradox of analysis?

Moore's conception of analysis


Let the analysandum be a sentence. A definition of its meaning is the aim of analysis. An analysis should define the relation of concepts mentioned separately in the analysandum in terms of the relation of concepts mentioned separately in the analysans.

Let A_1 stand for analysandum and A_2 for analysans which both belong to a natural language S , B_1 and B_2 respectively for their meanings (propositions). An adequate non-trivial analysis of A_1 should meet the following requirements:

1. Propositions B_1 and B_2 should "entail" each other. To assert that B_1 is true and B_2 is false is self-contradictory (and vice versa).
2. The sentence A_1 should not be a part of A_2 .
3. Concepts mentioned separately by A_2 should differ from concepts mentioned separately by A_1 or A_2 should mention separately more concepts than A_1 .
4. Each of the concept expressions contained in A_2 should permit to give a yes answer to the question "Is B_2 true if and only if B_1 is true?"

Consider a particular analysis as a procedure of an application of the method of analysis.

Insofar as it serves to fix the meaning of the analysandum consider Moore's concept of analysis as delimiting a kind of "hermeneutic circle" by a series of questions.



Can the paradox of analysis be escaped?

We should distinguish between sentences and propositions which in their turn involve concepts.



Call the sentence "The King of France is wise" T and the sentence "At least one person is a King of France, at most one person is a King of France, and there is not anybody who is a King of France and is not wise" U . Call the sentence "The sentence T means neither more nor less than that at least one person is a King of France, at most one person is a King of France, and there is not anybody who is a King of France and is not wise" P and the sentence "The sentence T means neither more nor less than is meant by the sentence U " Q .

1. **Can an analysis be both correct and non-trivial?** Moore's answer is yes. We must discriminate between necessary and sufficient conditions which two different sentences should meet to **mean the same** or **not the same**:
 - A necessary condition for saying with truth that two different sentences **express the same proposition (have the same meaning)** is fulfilled if propositions represented by the sentences "entail" each other. This condition is fulfilled for the sentences T and U . The correctness of an analysis can be defined in the terms of this condition.
 - A sufficient condition for saying with truth that two different sentences **express different propositions (have not the same meaning)** is fulfilled if the sentences do not produce the same ideas in those who understand them. This condition is fulfilled for the sentences T and U . The non-triviality of analysis can be defined in the terms of this condition.

2. **If the above definition of a correct analysis is assumed does the sentence that fixes the result of such an analysis permit a replacement of the analysans by the analysandum or a sentence that has the same meaning as the analysandum in any context?** The answer is no.

Call the sentence "Der König von Frankreich ist weise" T^* .

Substitute T and T^* for U in Q and P .

The sentence "The sentence T means neither more nor less than is meant by the sentence T^* " is a "mere tautology".

The sentence "The sentence T means neither more nor less than that the King of France is wise" is "obviously true" because those who understand English know what it means. This sentence is not a "mere tautology".

The sentence "The sentence T means neither more nor less than is meant by the sentence T^* " is true.

The sentence "The sentence T means neither more nor less than that der König von Frankreich ist weise" is not meaningful.

A sentence that fixes the result of an analysis should be discriminated from the statement about the relation "mean neither more nor less than is meant by" between two sentences (analysandum and analysans). The sentences P and Q function differently.

What is the character of analysis defined by Moore?

1. With respect to its aim the analysis is **decompositional**. To reply to the main question of analysis it is necessary to fix concepts to be mentioned in the analysans. They are determined as "parts" of the "whole" of the relations that constitute the truth conditions of the analysandum.
2. With respect to its instruments the analysis is **transformational** and **semiotical** (insofar as it determines different semiotical dimensions of the expression in question which are a sort of "parts" constituting the functioning of the expression). To fix the concepts to be mentioned in the analysans two tasks should be fulfilled:
 - 2.1. The analysandum should be transformed.
 - 2.2. First of all for the analysans as well as for its constituents first the possibilities of their replacement through other expressions (in particular those with fixed meanings) and second their pragmatical functions should be investigated.

References

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